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Суворов, Виктор - Суворов - Советская военная разведка: взгляд изнутри (engl)История >> История (наука и гипотезы) >> Суворов, Виктор Читать целиком бХЙРНП яСБНПНБ. яНБЕРЯЙЮЪ БНЕММЮЪ ПЮГБЕДЙЮ: БГЦКЪД ХГМСРПХ (engl)
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Copyright (c) 1984 by Viktor Suvorov
ISBN 0-02-615510-9
OCR: MadMax, May 2002
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Viktor Suvorov. Inside soviet military intelligence
To the memory of Oleg Vladimirovich Penkovsky
Contents
Introduction
PART ONE
1 The Triumvirate
2 History
3 The Pyramid
4 The GRU and the Military Industrial Commission (VPK)
5 But Why is Nothing Known about it?
6 The GRU and the 'Younger Brothers'
7 The GRU and the KGB
8 The Centre
9 The Procurement Organs
10 Fleet Intelligence
11 The GRU Processing Organs
12 Support Services
PART TWO
1 Illegals
2 The Undercover Residency
3 Agents
4 Agent Recruiting
5 Agent Communications
6 The Practice of Agent Work
7 Operational Intelligence
8 Tactical Reconnaissance
9 The Training and Privileges of Personnel
Conclusion
For GRU Officers Only
Appendix A: Leaders of Soviet Military Intelligence
Appendix B: The GRU High Command and Leading GRU Officers
Appendix C: Some Case Histories of GRU Activities
Index
Introduction
There is but one opinion as to which country in the world possesses the
most powerful secret intelligence service. Without the slightest doubt that
country is the Soviet Union, and the name of the monstrous secret
organisation without precedent in the history of mankind is the KGB. But on
the question as to which country possesses the second most powerful secret
organisation, the opinions of specialists differ. Strange as it may seem,
the country to which this organisation belongs is also the Soviet Union, and
the organisation itself is called the Chief Intelligence Directorate of the
General Staff.
This book was written in order to confirm this simple fact.
At first it was conceived as an instructional manual for a narrow
circle of specialists. Subsequently it was revised by the author for a wider
public. The revision was confined mainly to the excision of certain
definitions and technical details which would be of little interest. Even
after this, there remained in the book many details of a technical nature,
which may sometimes make for difficult reading. But though I may apologise,
there is nothing to be done. In order to understand a disease (and the
desire to understand a disease implies a desire to fight against it), one
must know its pathology as well as its symptoms.
x x x
For one of their very first chosen myths, the communists decided to
record that the organs of enforcement of the new State were not created
until the nineteenth of December 1917. This falsehood was circulated in
order to prove that Soviet power, in the first forty-one days of its
existence, could dispense with the mass executions so familiar to other
revolutions. The falsehood is easily exposed. It is sufficient to look at
the editions of the Bolshevist papers for those days which shook the world.
The Organs and subsequent mass executions existed from the first hour, the
first minute, the first infantile wail of this Soviet power. That first
night, having announced to the world the birth of the most bloodthirsty
dictatorship in its history, Lenin appointed its leaders. Among them was
comrade A. I. Rikov, the head of the People's Commissariat for Internal
Affairs which sounds less innocuous in its abbreviation, NKVD. Comrade Rikov
was later shot, but not before he had managed to write into the history of
the Organs certain bloody pages which the Soviet leadership would prefer to
forget about. Fifteen men have been appointed to the post of Head of the
Organs, of which three were hounded out of the Soviet government with
ignominy. One died at his post. One was secretly destroyed by members of the
Soviet government (as was later publicly admitted). Seven comrades were shot
or hanged, and tortured with great refinement before their official
punishment. We are not going to guess about the futures of three still
living who have occupied the post. The fate of the deputy heads has been
equally violent, even after the death of comrade Stalin.
The paradox of this endless bloody orgy would seem to be this. Why does
the most powerful criminal organisation in the world so easily and freely
give up its leaders to be torn to pieces? How is the Politburo able to deal
with them so unceremoniously, clearly not experiencing the slightest fear
before these seemingly all-powerful personalities and the organisations
headed by them? How is it that the Politburo has practically no difficulties
in displacing not only individual heads of State Security but in destroying
whole flocks of the most influential State Security officers? Where lies the
secret of this limitless power of the Politburo?
The answer is very simple. The method is an old one and has been used
successfully for thousands of years. It boils down to the principle: 'divide
and rule'. In the beginning, in order to rule, Lenin divided everything in
Russia that was capable of being divided, and ever since the communists have
continued faithfully to carry out the instructions of the great founder of
the first proletarian state.
Each system of governing the State is duplicated and reduplicated.
Soviet power itself is duplicated. If one visits any regional committee of
the Party and then the Regional Executive Committee one is struck by the
fact that two separate organizations having almost identical structures and
deciding identical prob1ems nevertheless take completely contradictory
decisions. Neither one of these organisations has the authority to decide
anything independently.
This same system exists at all stages and at all levels of the
Government. If we look at the really important decisions of the Soviet
leadership, those which are published in the papers, we will find that any
one of them is taken only at joint sessions of the Central Committee of the
Party and the Council of Ministers. I have in front of me as I write the
last joint resolution on raising the quality and widening the range of
production of children's toys. Neither the Council of Ministers of the
gigantic State structure nor the Central Committee of the ruling Party is
able, since neither has the power and authority, to take an independent
decision on such an important matter. But we are not talking here just about
Ministers and First Secretaries. At all lower levels the same procedure is
to be observed. For example, only a joint decision of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of a republic and the Council of Ministers of the
same republic, or the Provincial Committee and the Provincial Executive
Committee, is valid. At these levels of course, such crucial problems as the
quality of children's toys are not decided; but the principle remains that
no separate and independent decisions can be taken. In shape and form,
Soviet power is everywhere duplicated, from the planning of rocket
launchings into space to the organisation for the burial of Soviet citizens,
from the management of diplomatic missions abroad to lunatic asylums, from
the construction of sewers to atomic ice-breakers.
In addition to the governing organs which give orders and see that they
are carried out, there also exist Central Control Organs which are
independent of the local authority. The basic one of these is of course the
KGB, but independently of the KGB other powerful organs are also active: the
innocent-sounding People's Control for example, a secret police organisation
subordinated to a Politburo member who exercises almost as much influence as
the Chief of the KGB. In addition to the People's Control, the Ministry of
the Interior is also active and this is subordinated neither to the KGB nor
to Control. There is also the Central Organ of the press, a visit of which
to a factory or workshop causes hardly less anger than a visit of the OBHSS,
the socialist fraud squad. On the initiative of Lenin, it was seen as
essential that each powerful organ or organisation which is capable of
taking independent decisions be counter-balanced by the existence of another
no less powerful bureaucratic organisation. The thinking goes: we have a
newspaper Pravda, let's have another on a similar scale - Izvestia. Tass
created, as a counter-balance to it, APN. Not for competition but simply for
duplication. In this way the comrades in the Politburo are able to live a
quieter life. To control everybody and everything is absolutely impossible,
and this is why duplication exists. Everybody jealously pursues his rival
and in good time informs whoever he should inform of any flashes of
inspiration, of any deviation from the established norm, any effort to look
at what is going on from the standpoint of a healthy critical mind.
Duplication in everything is the prime principle and reason behind the
terrifying stagnation of all walks of life in Soviet society. It is also the
reason for the unprecedented stability of the regime. In duplicating the
Organs, the Politburo was able to neutralise any attempt by them to raise
the standard of revolt against their creators, and thus it has always been.
The creation of a system of parallel institutions began with the
creation of the Tcheka, an organisation called into existence to
counter-balance the already growing powers of the People's Commissariat for
Internal Affairs. During the course of the whole of the civil war these two
bloody organisations existed independently, and as rivals, of each other.
Their influence grew to immense proportions, and Lenin suggested the
creation of yet another independent organ to carry out the task of control
and retribution, the Rabkrin. This organ, known today as the People's
Control, is still waiting for somebody to research into its history. The
Rabkrin was Lenin's love-child, remembered by him even on his deathbed. The
Rabkrin or, more formally, the Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate was not
created as an organ of repression for the whole population, but as an
organisation for the control of the ruling Bolshevik elite and, above all,
the Tcheka and the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs.
In the meantime the tentacles of the Tcheka had spread out over the
frontiers and the Bolkshevik leaders were forced to create yet another
parallel organisation to the Tcheka, capable of counterbalancing its
external activities. Neither the People's Commissariat nor the Rabkrin was
able to fulfill this role. On the personal order of the indefatigable Lenin
on 21 October 1918, an external intelligence service, completely independent
of the Tcheka, was created under the meaningless title of the Registered
Directorate of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. At the present time it
is called the Chief Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the
Soviet Army, and also known by its military classification as 'unit 44388'.
In history there is a number of examples of similar organisations within
repressive regimes. The most obvious of these is of course Hitler's Germany.
The SS and the SA and, on the front, the Wehrmacht Divisions and the
Divisions of the SS, all existed under the same duplication principle, as
did the two Intelligence Services, the Gestapo and the Abwehr.
This multiplication of institutions can only be explained by the desire
of the ruling class to guarantee the stability of its regime. It is
important to clarify this, so that one can understand the role of Soviet
military intelligence in Soviet society and in the international arena, and,
in addition, the reason why this organisation has remained throughout Soviet
history largely independent from the KGB, in spite of the many ordeals it
has been subjected to.
PART ONE
Chapter One
The Triumvirate
The Party, the KGB and the Army form the triumvirate which rules the
Soviet Union. All other institutions and organisations, including those
which appear officially to wield State power, occupy a subordinate position.
But no single one of the three holds absolute power. They are all
interdependent and have to share power with their rivals. There is a
constant underlying struggle between these three forces, with attacks and
retreats, bloody skirmishes, victories, defeats, armistices, secret
alliances and permanent treachery.
The Party cannot exist without a continuous repression of the people,
in other words without the KGB. The KGB in turn cannot exist without a
continuous fanning of the flames of communist fanaticism and the deception
of the people, in other words without the Party. Each of the two considers
its own function to be the important one and the function of its rival
merely supplementary. Thus the Party and the KGB are striving for undivided
rule, but with this in mind each understands that it is not possible to kill
off its rival. Too much depends on the continued existence of that rival.
Both the Party and the KGB need the Army, which plays the part of a
performing crocodile, ensuring a quiet life for the other two. In the
triumvirate system the Army is the most powerful element but it is also the
most deprived as regards its rights. Unlike the Party and the KGB, the Army
has never played the leading role in the trio. Should this ever happen, the
Party and the KGB would be swiftly destroyed. The fact is that this
crocodile does not need either the Party or the KGB. Its natural state is a
free life in a swamp, enjoying the ability to gobble up whatever it wishes.
Both the Party and the KGB are Perfectly well aware that they, in the role
of trainers of the performing crocodile, would be its first victims should
the crocodile ever be set at liberty. So why has the crocodile never gobbled
up its trainers?
The Party and the KGB hold the crocodile firmly in check by means of
two strong leashes. The Party leash is called the Political Department, that
of the KGB the Special Department. Every organ of the Army is penetrated by
the Political Department of the Party and the Special Department of the KGB.
On those occasions when the Army has attacked the Party, which has happened
several times, beginning with the military opposition of the twenties, the
Tchekists of the KGB have come into action and quickly gained control over
dissident elements in the Army. When the Army has attacked the KGB, as
happened after the death of Stalin, the Party has gone into action against
it. And at times when the KGB has been plotting against the Party, the Party
has invariably allowed the crocodile to take a bite at the Tchekists, but
not a bite to the death. After such incidents the situation has returned to
normal -the crocodile's trainers have manipulated their leashes in such a
way and from different sides that it is impossible for any quarrel to have a
conclusion. They have even been able to give the crocodile a few kicks and,
if necessary, to direct it to another side, as it is said 'against any
aggressor'. Its dependent situation notwithstanding, the Army is
sufficiently strong sometimes to pull its two trainers after it. Thus it is
not possible for the Army to be left out of the triumvirate. None of the
remaining inhabitants of the Soviet Union has any independent part to play
in the concert. They fulfil an auxiliary role. They supply food to the
trainers and the crocodile, put on their make-up for the show, announce the
different acts and collect money from the terrified spectators.
The general staff of the Soviet Army is the brain of the crocodile, and
military intelligence is its eyes and ears. The GRU is a part of the general
staff, in other words a part of the brain. In fact it is that part which
analyses what the eyes see and the ears hear, the part which concentrates
the unblinking eyes of the crocodile onto the most interesting targets and
trains its ears to hear with precision every rustle of the night. Although
the crocodile is firmly tied to the Party and the KGB, the general staff and
the integral GRU are practically independent of external control. Why this
should be is explained by the Party's experience. In the period before the
war, the Party supervised the general staff so carefully, and the Tchekists
insisted strongly on the observance of every minute directive of the Party,
that the general staff completely lost the ability to think independently.
As a result the crocodile, despite its enormous size, completely lost its
presence of mind, its speed of reaction and any capability to think and take
independent decisions All this brought the system to the edge of
catastrophe, as the Army became practically incapable of fighting. The Party
learnt from this sad experience and realised that it must not interfere in
the working of the crocodile's brain, even if this brain had ceased to think
along Party lines. The Party and the KGB preferred, for purely practical
reasons, to keep only the body of the crocodile under control and not to
interfere with the work of its brain, of its sharp ears and piercing eyes.
Chapter Two
History
Soviet military intelligence [The Russian version of the English
'intelligence' - razvedka - has wider significance and includes everything
we understand by the terms 'intelligence', 'reconnaissance', 'surveillance'
and all activity governing collection and processing of information about
actual or potential enemies.] and its superior organ, the GRU, are an
integral part of the Army. The history of Soviet intelligence can therefore
only be surveyed in the light of the history of the development of the Army
and consequently in the light of the continuous struggle between the Army,
the Party and the KGB. From the moment of the creation of the first
detachment of the Red Army, small intelligence groups were formed within
these detachments quietly and often without any order from above. As the
regular army developed into newly-formed regiments, brigades, divisions,
army corps and armies, so these intelligence organs developed with it. From
the outset, intelligence units at all levels were subordinated to the
corresponding staffs. At the same time the superior echelons of intelligence
exercised control and direction of the lower echelons. The chief of
intelligence of an army corps, for example, had his own personal
intelligence unit and in addition directed the chiefs of intelligence of the
divisions which formed a part of his army corps. Each divisional
intelligence chief, in his turn, had his own intelligence unit at the same
time as directing the activities of the intelligence chiefs of the brigades
which formed his division. And so on down the scale. On 13 June 1918 a front
was formed, for the first time in the composition of the Red Army. This
front received the name of the Eastern Front, and in it there were five
armies and the Volga military flotilla. On the same day there was created a
'registrational' (intelligence) department in the Eastern Front. The
department had the intelligence chiefs of all five armies and the flotilla
reporting to it. These intelligence chiefs of the front possessed a number
of aircraft for aerial reconnaissance, some cavalry squadrons and, most
important, an agent network. The agent network for the Eastern Front was
first formed on the basis of underground organisations of Bolsheviks and
other parties which supported them. Subsequently the network grew and,
during the advances of the Eastern Front in the Urals and in Siberia, agent
groups and organisations intervened in the rear of the enemy before the main
forces attacked. Subsequent to the formation of the Eastern Front, new
fronts were added to the Red Army: the Southern, Ukrainian, Northern,
Turkistan and, later, Caucasian, Western, South- Eastern, North-Eastern and
others. The intelligence set-up for each front was organised in the same way
as that for the Eastern Front. There were also some independent and separate
armies which did not form part of the fronts, and these, as a rule, had
their own independent networks.
In the spring of 1918, besides the agent, aerial and other types of
intelligence services, the diversionary intelligence service came into
being. These diversionary detachments reported to the intelligence chiefs of
fronts, armies, corps and sometimes divisions, and were called the 'cavalry
of special assignments'. Formed from the best cavalrymen in the Army, they
dressed in the uniform of the enemy and were used to carry out deep raids in
the enemy's rear, to take prisoners - especially staff officers - to collect
information on enemy positions and activities and to undermine and sometimes
physically destroy the enemy's command structure. The number of these
diversionary units and their numerical strength constantly increased. In
1920, on the Polish Front, on the staff of the Soviet forces, there was a
separate cavalry brigade for 'special assignments' with a strength of more
than two thousand cavalrymen, and this was on top of several regiments and
separate squadrons. All these units were dressed in Polish uniform. Much
later these diversionary units received the name Spetsnaz, now given to all
special forces of the GRU.
>From its inception, military intelligence suffered the greatest
Possible antagonism from the Tchekists. The Tcheka had its own central agent
network and an agent network in local areas. The Tchekists jealously guarded
their right to have secret agents and could not resign themselves to the
idea that anyone else was operating similar secret networks. The Tcheka also
had units of 'special assignments' which carried out raids, not in the
enemy's rear, but in its own rear, destroying those who were dissatisfied
with the communist order.
During the civil war the Tcheka strove to unite all special assignment
units under its own control. Several cases are recorded of the Tchekists
trying to take over organs of military intelligence. One such attempt
occurred on 10 July 1918 when the Tcheka shot the whole staff of the Eastern
Front intelligence department, which had been in existence for only twenty-
seven days, together with the entire staff of the front and the commander
himself, M. A. Muravev, who had been trying to intervene in favour of his
intelligence department. The whole of the agent system of military
intelligence passed into the control of the Tchekists, but this brought the
front to the very edge of catastrophe. The new commander, I. I. Vatsetis,
and his chief of staff had no intelligence service of their own, and were
unable to ask for the necessary information. They could only request
information in a very tactful way, being well aware of the Tcheka's attitude
to those it disliked. (As regards Vatsetis the Tchekists did indeed shoot
him, but much later.)
Naturally while the agent network was under the control of the Tcheka,
its own work was given priority, and any tasks set it by the Army Command
were given very low priority. This of course brought the forces very near to
complete defeat. If the army intelligence service is separated from the army
staff, then the brain becomes nothing more than the brain of a blind and
deaf man. Even if the blind man receives essential information from one
source or another, his reaction will still be slow and his movements
imprecise. The leader of the Red Army, Trotsky, placed an ultimatum before
Lenin: either give me an independent military intelligence service or let
Dzerzhinsky lead the Army with his Tchekists.
Lenin knew what the Tcheka was capable of but he also knew that its
capabilities were extremely one-sided. He therefore ordered Dzerzhinsky not
to interfere in matters of military intelligence. In spite of this, the
Tcheka's attempts to swallow up military intelligence went on, and these
efforts still continue on a reduced scale up to the present day.
Towards the end of 1918 the organisation of military intelligence from
regimental staff level up to the level of front staff had been virtually
completed. There remained only one staff which as deprived of its own
intelligence service of the Republic, the staff of the Red Army (at that
time called the Field Staff, later the General Staff). For this reason the
general staff remained blind and deaf, obtaining information indispensable
to its work at secondor third-hand. In addition to this, the absence of a
superior intelligence organ meant a complete lack of co-ordination of the
front intelligence services. Military intelligence had acquired a pyramid
structure, but the top of the pyramid was missing. The Chief of the Army and
in charge of all military production, Leon Trotsky several times approached
Lenin with the demand that he should create such a superior military
intelligence organ. Understanding the necessity for the creation of such an
organ, but realising that this would inevitably mean a strengthening of the
position of Trotsky, Lenin prevaricated and repeatedly refused Trotsky's
suggestion. At the beginning of autumn, the position of the communists
worsened sharply. Production, fuel and political crises became more acute.
Armed uprisings were taking place against the communists. There was an
attempt on the life of Lenin himself. In order to save the regime the
communists decided on a desperate measure. In each town and village they
would take hostages and, in the case of the slightest manifestation of
discontent among the inhabitants, these hostages would be shot. The Soviet
state was saved, by mass executions. Then another problem arose. The Tcheka,
released from its restraints and drunk with blood, got out of control. In
Tver and Torzhok the Tchekists, together with the hostages, destroyed
communist leaders who displeased them. One threat to the stability of the
state had been replaced by another, far worse. Lenin, not yet completely
recovered, immediately resumed day-to-day leadership. Without restricting
the terror, he took a number of steps to control it. The most important of
his decisions were, firstly, to give to the People's Commissariats (i.e. the
ministries), the provincial and town committees the right to take part in
court cases against arrested communists. A communist would be declared not
guilty if two members of the Party Committee testified in his favour.
Secondly, Lenin directed his attention to the annulment of the Tcheka's
monopoly of secret activity. He finally accepted Trotsky's proposal and on
21 October 1918 signed a decree, creating a superior organ of Soviet
military intelligence which was to be called the Registrational Directorate
of the Field Staff of the Republic.
The newly created directorate did not increase or decrease the
importance of the front and army intelligence services, it merely co-
ordinated them. But at this time the directorate began the creation of a new
network of agents which could be active in countries all over the world,
including those where the front networks already had active agents. The
organisation created in 1918 has, in principle, survived to the present day.
Certainly the founding rules are fully applicable to our own time. These
are, firstly, that each military staff must have its own independent
intelligence set-up. Secondly, the intelligence set-up of subordinate staffs
is to be fully under the command of the intelligence of superior formations.
Thirdly, the agent network must be part of the composition of the general
staff intelligence network and part of the composition of the front and
fleet intelligence services. (In peace-time this means military districts
and groups of forces.) Fourthly, diversionary intelligence is subsidiary to
agent intelligence. It must be found on front or fleet level, military
districts and groups of forces and also at the level of armies and
flotillas. And, fifthly and most importantly, military intelligence must be
quite separate from the organs of enforcement and their intelligence
services. Since 1918, each one of these rules has been broken at least once,
if not more often, but invariably the mistake has been summarily corrected.
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пришли как-то Иа, винни-пух, и пятачок к кролику, а у него на столе
кости обглоданные на тарелке валяются. Иа спросил, чьи кости-
свиньи-ответил кролик. через 2 часа: винни-кролику: "хорошо посидели,
только Пятачок рано ушел" (на столе до сих пор валялись обглоданные
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